srilanka1998
Member
- Registriert
- 26. Juli 2005
- Beiträge
- 511
Ich hab mir die Mühe gemacht, diesen Bericht aus einem Heft für euch abzuschreiben. Leider ist es in Englisch - vielleicht hat ja jemand Zeit um es auf Deutsch zu übersetzen. Ist für mich sehr erschreckend was ich da zu lesen bekommen hab:
Serious questions have been raised as to whether the post tsunami reconstruction and development work undertaken by a plethora of organisations and task forces in Sri Lanka had paid dividends.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa wants his government to provide housing to all the victims before the second anniversary of the tsunami.
But the authorities are left with just two month from now and one wonders whether this target could be met, given the fact that a large number of INGOs and NGOs have failed to adhere to the earlier pledge to help Sri Lanka build houses for the victims.
Though Sri Lanka never witnessed a disaster of this magnitude in its recorded history; not even remotely so, the Disaster Management Centre under the Ministry of Social Welfare, (though not fully), war geared to a great extent to look into the immediate needs of the victims.
The Disaster Management Centre (DMC) commenced a 24-hour operation, with eight telephone lines fixed in a room that collected data and information regarding the plight of the victims.
President Kumaratunga was not present when the tsunami struck the island, but upon arrival from her overseas trip, after the devastation, she brought all post tsunami reconstruction works under her authority.
The President, with her executive powers vested under her, went to the extent of even overlooking the functions of the Social Welfare Ministry that was created under a Parliamentary Act, and formed several task forces namely the Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU), Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP), Rehabilitation of Persons, Properties and Industries Authority (REPPIA) and Task Force for Relief (TAFOR), to undertake the post tsunami reconstruction work.
These task forces were centralised agencies headquartered in Colombo and did not function in coordianation with the Ministry of Social Welfare.
The creation of such highly centralised agencies was disastrous firstly, the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) took advantage of the weakness of these agencies and secondly there was tremendous resentment in the district and divisional administration against the Colombo based officials who appeared alien to them.
This resulted in some of the orders not being carried out by the local level administrators. Therefore delays in the acquisition of lands an processing relevant documents for housing purposes became obvious. The local level administration that was the closest to the problem was disempowered and the post tsunami reconstruction work was either hampered or started moving at snail's pace.
Adding to the misery, the TAFREN officials were paid exorbitantly.
The salaries each official drew were far above the salaries received by an ordinary government servant according to the accepted salary structure of the state. Some even received salaries ten times higher than a cabinet minister. This certainly demorallised the public sector that worked round the clock at grassroots level immediately after the tsunami.
However, after President Mahinda Rajapaksa took over the reign, he diagnosed the problem and realised that previous task forces were highly over centralised and took an immediate step to freeze the functions of these organizations and bring them under the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA).
If President Rajapaksa's aim was to provide a house each to every tsunami victim who lost his/her house during the tsunami, the fact that some 40'000 families are still living in temporaty shelters in a clear indication that RADA has not performed its role.
The RADA officials charge that the former Chief Operations Officer (COO) Saliya Wickremasuiya should have been a grassroots person, conversant with village realities specialised in relating to divisional and district administration and with experience in disaster management work.
Wickremasuriya is an expert on oil exploation an questions are raised as to how he could have managed the post tsunami reconstruction work in Sri Lanka.
It is reliably learnt that Wickremasuriya had submitted a board paper demanding an exorbitant salary and other allowances.
It is also learnt even before the board ratified his probosal he had already been issued a cheque from the finance division of RADA.
Shockingly so, he had demanded a total remuneration package amounting to almost RS. 375'000 (comprising salary Rs. 150'000, house rent allowance Rs. 100'000 and care lease hire allowance Rs. 125'000) plus telephone and fuel costs per month for the period December 2005 to May 2006.
Furthermore, he has also demanded for a house rent allowance of Rs. 100'000 per month from RADA for the period May 15, to August 15, 2006 and a part time salary of Rs. 75'000 per month when he was expected to continue working in RADA as Chief Operating Officer while at the same time working as the full time Chairman of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).
Wickremasuriya had submitted his paper to the board that met at the end of June. The board, while recommending his proposals had not taken a decision to ratify it. The minutes of the meeting were to be ratified during the next board meeting, scheduled for August 31, but it is learnt Wickramasuriya had already received his cheque. Wo would have forced Director Finance and Administration of RADA Dr. Jayantha Samarasinghe to pay Wickramasuriya his cheque?
It is noteworthy to mention that any funds flowing in from any foreign donor agency, becomes public funds once reaching a particular country. And when payments are made using these funds to individuals involved in any project, normal regulations stipulated in the law regarding the payment to a government servant must be applied.
Also, if such funds are to be utilised to pay locals, then the treasury must decide on the salary scale. But unfortunately President Kumaratunga has overlooked these principles when offering salaries to TAFREN staff.
A few others who draw astronomical figures from the money meant for tsunami victims at RADA are Dencer de Zylya, Director Risk Management who draws a salary of Rs. 215'000 while there is no specific risk management function at RADA. Rachel Perera Director NGO/Donor Civil Society Coordination (Rs. 215'000), Achini Senaratne, Director Health Education (Rs. 190'000) and Saman Relapanawa, Project Director of the Southwest Hounsing Construction Unit (Rs. 200'000).
A comparison of the salaries received by the top officials of RADA and their performance revel that RADA under Wickramasuriya has thoroughly failed to uphold the spirit of the Mahinda Chinthanaya.
According to available information som 56'623 transitionary shelters were constructed after the tsunami. It was in to these houses that tsunami hit families were transferred from the temporary camps located in temples, churches and schools immediately after the tsunami in 2004.
After over one and a half years, only 6'861 shelters have been de-commissioned. 5'266 families who had lived in them were re-settled in permanent houses while the remaining 1'595 probably went off to live with relatives or friends.
The net result is that out of the 56'523 temporary/transitional shelters that were constructed, as many as 40'000 still remain. What then has been RADA's output during the seven months of its existence? Does the output justify the huge salaries paid to senior staff and the huge remunneration package claimed by the COO who has been presiding over the destiny of RADA for the past seven month?
Does ist not mean that RADA must even now be fiven a full time chairman to give it proper guidance and leadership? These are questions, one is sure of, to be raised by the victims themselves after realising, that tsunami funds in Sri Lanka are being used not to feed the hungry but the well fed.
In the backdrop of all this, it is also sad to note that the International Non Governmental Organisations (INGO's) have hardly contributed towards meeting the needs of the tsunami victims even after making pledges. Statistics confirm that the INGOs have failed miserably to deliver the goods to the Sri Lankan tsunami victims, while making bogus promises.
Immediately after the devastation a number of unregistered organisations came forward to help Lankan victims. There was tremendous potential supply. A whole lot of pseudo organizations appeared and put out their web sites saying they were collecting money to help tsunami victims.
These organizations took advantage of the Sri Lankan government's failure to adopt a mechanism to channel all the money the donors and well wishers pledged to grant to a recognized state body. The pseudo organizations collected money and joined the existing small NGOs in the country and carried out a media campaign in the West saying the Sri Lankan government was not helping the people.
In the meantime the mushrooming small time NGOs made enough money.
Abroad, a lot of people donated money. The bus drivers sacrificed their day's wage, school children sacrificed their mid day meal to collect money to help Sri Lanka. But where has all the money gone?
In a certain village in the deep South a couple from a European country pledged to raise funds to build houses by collecting paintings from the tsunami children. They collected the paintings, took them to different countries, collected large amounts of money and returned to Sri Lanka and presented only 60 plastic chairs to the local temple. Thereafter they built for themselves a beautiful house on stilts, hardly ten metres from the sea in the district where a poor man was not allowed to build a house.
The INGOs collected money from the multilateral donor agencies after entering into several MOUs with the local administrators. They produced the MOUs to their headquarters to collect money. Nothing was going through a gevernment agency or the ministry.
While some INGOs and local NGOs did offer genuine help to the victims, others were again feasting on the money collected.
Of the 68'914 housing units pledged by the INGOs, only 2'895 have been completed. Of the 57 INGOs, that came forward with promises to help Sri Lankan tsunami victims, only eight organizations, China Charity Federation, MPDL Spanish Co, American Mission Grace Church, Houston Buddhist Temple, Kaerntner Wochen ZeitungsgmbH & Co KG, NORSK SOLIDARITET, Themes Temple-England and Freies Wort Hilft E.V have lived up to their pledges.
All other INGOs have failted by pledging and not fulfilling them. For instance the Red Cross that pledged 15'000 housing units has completed only 169. Caritas that promised 26'000 units had completed only 72. World Vision Lanka that promised 10'000 units has completed only 198.
The question is who should be held responsible for this huge lapse?
Quelle: Adoh! Satisfy your curiosity / October 2006
Serious questions have been raised as to whether the post tsunami reconstruction and development work undertaken by a plethora of organisations and task forces in Sri Lanka had paid dividends.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa wants his government to provide housing to all the victims before the second anniversary of the tsunami.
But the authorities are left with just two month from now and one wonders whether this target could be met, given the fact that a large number of INGOs and NGOs have failed to adhere to the earlier pledge to help Sri Lanka build houses for the victims.
Though Sri Lanka never witnessed a disaster of this magnitude in its recorded history; not even remotely so, the Disaster Management Centre under the Ministry of Social Welfare, (though not fully), war geared to a great extent to look into the immediate needs of the victims.
The Disaster Management Centre (DMC) commenced a 24-hour operation, with eight telephone lines fixed in a room that collected data and information regarding the plight of the victims.
President Kumaratunga was not present when the tsunami struck the island, but upon arrival from her overseas trip, after the devastation, she brought all post tsunami reconstruction works under her authority.
The President, with her executive powers vested under her, went to the extent of even overlooking the functions of the Social Welfare Ministry that was created under a Parliamentary Act, and formed several task forces namely the Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU), Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP), Rehabilitation of Persons, Properties and Industries Authority (REPPIA) and Task Force for Relief (TAFOR), to undertake the post tsunami reconstruction work.
These task forces were centralised agencies headquartered in Colombo and did not function in coordianation with the Ministry of Social Welfare.
The creation of such highly centralised agencies was disastrous firstly, the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) took advantage of the weakness of these agencies and secondly there was tremendous resentment in the district and divisional administration against the Colombo based officials who appeared alien to them.
This resulted in some of the orders not being carried out by the local level administrators. Therefore delays in the acquisition of lands an processing relevant documents for housing purposes became obvious. The local level administration that was the closest to the problem was disempowered and the post tsunami reconstruction work was either hampered or started moving at snail's pace.
Adding to the misery, the TAFREN officials were paid exorbitantly.
The salaries each official drew were far above the salaries received by an ordinary government servant according to the accepted salary structure of the state. Some even received salaries ten times higher than a cabinet minister. This certainly demorallised the public sector that worked round the clock at grassroots level immediately after the tsunami.
However, after President Mahinda Rajapaksa took over the reign, he diagnosed the problem and realised that previous task forces were highly over centralised and took an immediate step to freeze the functions of these organizations and bring them under the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA).
If President Rajapaksa's aim was to provide a house each to every tsunami victim who lost his/her house during the tsunami, the fact that some 40'000 families are still living in temporaty shelters in a clear indication that RADA has not performed its role.
The RADA officials charge that the former Chief Operations Officer (COO) Saliya Wickremasuiya should have been a grassroots person, conversant with village realities specialised in relating to divisional and district administration and with experience in disaster management work.
Wickremasuriya is an expert on oil exploation an questions are raised as to how he could have managed the post tsunami reconstruction work in Sri Lanka.
It is reliably learnt that Wickremasuriya had submitted a board paper demanding an exorbitant salary and other allowances.
It is also learnt even before the board ratified his probosal he had already been issued a cheque from the finance division of RADA.
Shockingly so, he had demanded a total remuneration package amounting to almost RS. 375'000 (comprising salary Rs. 150'000, house rent allowance Rs. 100'000 and care lease hire allowance Rs. 125'000) plus telephone and fuel costs per month for the period December 2005 to May 2006.
Furthermore, he has also demanded for a house rent allowance of Rs. 100'000 per month from RADA for the period May 15, to August 15, 2006 and a part time salary of Rs. 75'000 per month when he was expected to continue working in RADA as Chief Operating Officer while at the same time working as the full time Chairman of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).
Wickremasuriya had submitted his paper to the board that met at the end of June. The board, while recommending his proposals had not taken a decision to ratify it. The minutes of the meeting were to be ratified during the next board meeting, scheduled for August 31, but it is learnt Wickramasuriya had already received his cheque. Wo would have forced Director Finance and Administration of RADA Dr. Jayantha Samarasinghe to pay Wickramasuriya his cheque?
It is noteworthy to mention that any funds flowing in from any foreign donor agency, becomes public funds once reaching a particular country. And when payments are made using these funds to individuals involved in any project, normal regulations stipulated in the law regarding the payment to a government servant must be applied.
Also, if such funds are to be utilised to pay locals, then the treasury must decide on the salary scale. But unfortunately President Kumaratunga has overlooked these principles when offering salaries to TAFREN staff.
A few others who draw astronomical figures from the money meant for tsunami victims at RADA are Dencer de Zylya, Director Risk Management who draws a salary of Rs. 215'000 while there is no specific risk management function at RADA. Rachel Perera Director NGO/Donor Civil Society Coordination (Rs. 215'000), Achini Senaratne, Director Health Education (Rs. 190'000) and Saman Relapanawa, Project Director of the Southwest Hounsing Construction Unit (Rs. 200'000).
A comparison of the salaries received by the top officials of RADA and their performance revel that RADA under Wickramasuriya has thoroughly failed to uphold the spirit of the Mahinda Chinthanaya.
According to available information som 56'623 transitionary shelters were constructed after the tsunami. It was in to these houses that tsunami hit families were transferred from the temporary camps located in temples, churches and schools immediately after the tsunami in 2004.
After over one and a half years, only 6'861 shelters have been de-commissioned. 5'266 families who had lived in them were re-settled in permanent houses while the remaining 1'595 probably went off to live with relatives or friends.
The net result is that out of the 56'523 temporary/transitional shelters that were constructed, as many as 40'000 still remain. What then has been RADA's output during the seven months of its existence? Does the output justify the huge salaries paid to senior staff and the huge remunneration package claimed by the COO who has been presiding over the destiny of RADA for the past seven month?
Does ist not mean that RADA must even now be fiven a full time chairman to give it proper guidance and leadership? These are questions, one is sure of, to be raised by the victims themselves after realising, that tsunami funds in Sri Lanka are being used not to feed the hungry but the well fed.
In the backdrop of all this, it is also sad to note that the International Non Governmental Organisations (INGO's) have hardly contributed towards meeting the needs of the tsunami victims even after making pledges. Statistics confirm that the INGOs have failed miserably to deliver the goods to the Sri Lankan tsunami victims, while making bogus promises.
Immediately after the devastation a number of unregistered organisations came forward to help Lankan victims. There was tremendous potential supply. A whole lot of pseudo organizations appeared and put out their web sites saying they were collecting money to help tsunami victims.
These organizations took advantage of the Sri Lankan government's failure to adopt a mechanism to channel all the money the donors and well wishers pledged to grant to a recognized state body. The pseudo organizations collected money and joined the existing small NGOs in the country and carried out a media campaign in the West saying the Sri Lankan government was not helping the people.
In the meantime the mushrooming small time NGOs made enough money.
Abroad, a lot of people donated money. The bus drivers sacrificed their day's wage, school children sacrificed their mid day meal to collect money to help Sri Lanka. But where has all the money gone?
In a certain village in the deep South a couple from a European country pledged to raise funds to build houses by collecting paintings from the tsunami children. They collected the paintings, took them to different countries, collected large amounts of money and returned to Sri Lanka and presented only 60 plastic chairs to the local temple. Thereafter they built for themselves a beautiful house on stilts, hardly ten metres from the sea in the district where a poor man was not allowed to build a house.
The INGOs collected money from the multilateral donor agencies after entering into several MOUs with the local administrators. They produced the MOUs to their headquarters to collect money. Nothing was going through a gevernment agency or the ministry.
While some INGOs and local NGOs did offer genuine help to the victims, others were again feasting on the money collected.
Of the 68'914 housing units pledged by the INGOs, only 2'895 have been completed. Of the 57 INGOs, that came forward with promises to help Sri Lankan tsunami victims, only eight organizations, China Charity Federation, MPDL Spanish Co, American Mission Grace Church, Houston Buddhist Temple, Kaerntner Wochen ZeitungsgmbH & Co KG, NORSK SOLIDARITET, Themes Temple-England and Freies Wort Hilft E.V have lived up to their pledges.
All other INGOs have failted by pledging and not fulfilling them. For instance the Red Cross that pledged 15'000 housing units has completed only 169. Caritas that promised 26'000 units had completed only 72. World Vision Lanka that promised 10'000 units has completed only 198.
The question is who should be held responsible for this huge lapse?
Quelle: Adoh! Satisfy your curiosity / October 2006
aber wir konnten dort keine ngo`s,ingo`s geschweige denn erneuerung oder ...neubau oder hilfe usw...entdecken 
über einen kamm scheren! 
