srilanka1998
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- 26. Juli 2005
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Sri Lankan State-sponsored lies on Paramilitary activities!
[ TamilCanadian ] [ 02:12 GMT, Feb. 14, 2006 ]
"Monitors from SLMM District Office 5 in Batticaloa (DO 5) visited the alleged Karuna Group Camp in Thivuchchenai / Diwulsena on 26 March at approximately 0900 hours. "The Karuna Group Camp is located on the northern side of the road and fenced with barbed wire. The size of the camp is approximately 50X30 metres with fire positions in the corners. The Camp has a mix of accommodations (sic) and more structures. The first camps were established in the jungle north of Thivuchchena/Diwulsena village but in December 2004 the Karuna faction established a camp in the village itself. Initially the camp was located closer to the tarmac road before SLA told them to move. The camp was then moved to its present location. According to the 2ic, today's total strength of this Karuna group is 140 combatants. The main Karuna camps are now in the jungle North of Thivuchchenai/Diwulsena.
National Police and Para-Military forces
Source: The Library of Congress
The Sri Lankan National Police is an integral part of the nation's security forces, with primary responsibility for internal security. Specially trained commando units of the police are regularly deployed in joint operations with the armed forces, and the police command structure in Northern and Eastern provinces is closely integrated with the other security organizations under the authority of the Joint Operations Command. The police is headed by an inspector general of police who reports to the minister of defense.
Organization
In 1988 the police force was divided into three geographic commands--known as ranges--covering the northern, central, and southern sectors of the island. The ranges were subdivided into divisions, districts, and stations, and Colombo was designated as a special division. In 1974 there were a total of 260 police stations throughout the country. In more remote rural areas beyond the immediate range of existing police stations, law enforcement functions are carried out by locally elected village headmen (grama seva niladhari, literally "village service officers"). In addition to its regular forces, the national police operated a small reserve contingent and a number of specialized units responsible for investigative and paramilitary functions. Routine criminal activity was handled by the Criminal Investigation Department under the command of an assistant superintendent of police. More coordinated threats to internal security, such as that posed by the radical Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna were the responsibility of the Countersubversive Division, which was primarily an investigative division. Special operational units included the Commando Squad of the Colombo police and the Special Task Force. The former, a 200-strong riot control force, was established following the anti-Tamil riots of 1983. The Special Task Force is a police field force. It was set up in 1984 with the assistance of foreign advisers (primarily former British Special Air Service personnel under the auspices of Keeny Meeny Services, see Sri Lanka - Foreign Military Relations , this ch.). Its 1,100-member force was organized into 7 companies and trained in counterinsurgency techniques. It played a major role in the government's combined force operations against the Tamil Tigers in Eastern Province before July 1987. Following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the Special Task Force was redesignated the Police Special Force, and deployed in Southern Province, where it immediately went into action against the JVP terrorists. Companies of the force also served in rotation as part of the presidential security guard.
Until 1984 the police were responsible for national intelligence functions, first under the Special Branch, and later under the Intelligence Services Division. The perceived failure of the Intelligence Services Division during the riots of July 1983 led the Jayewardene government to reevaluate the nation's intelligence network, and in 1984 the president set up a National Intelligence Bureau. The new organization combined intelligence units from the army, navy, air force, and police. It was headed by a deputy inspector general of police who reported directly to the Ministry of Defence.
Karuna Camp: The secret probe
By: Iqbal Athas
Source: The Sunday Times - December 25, 2005
Two high ranking officers in the country's security establishment, The Sunday Times can reveal today, carried out a "TOP SECRET" operation in March, this year, to probe a matter of serious concern for Tiger guerrillas - attacks on them by the renegade Karuna group purportedly in collusion with the Sri Lanka Army.
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) then Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri (also then Commander of the Navy) and former Commander of the Army, then Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda were acting on a report in a Sunday newspaper. The report in March, this year, had revealed that the Karuna group operated a camp in Thivuchchenai in the Polonnaruwa district.
This revelation, however, was first probed by Army Headquarters. Thereafter, writing on behalf of the Commander of the Army, Brigadier J. Jayasuriya sent a report to Chief of Defence Staff, then Vice Admiral Sandagiri. In this report dated March 30, 2005 he said investigations revealed that the bunker referred to in the report was located in the Muthugala village (Grid Reference: 435090 -Vakaneri Map).
The report said: "Security Forces have abandoned this bunker. Commanding Officer has investigated the bunker 231 and taken photographs. These photographs were given to us. This bunker has not been used by Karuna cadres for any reasons."
"This newspaper article is wrong and gives the wrong impression to people. This kind of newspaper article can create problems to the peace process. There can be disputes between the Government and the LTTE." the report added. Based on this report, then Military Spokesman was directed to issue a denial which he did.
But the matter did not stop there. Admiral Sandagiri and Lt. Gen. Kottegoda detailed Brigadier Milinda Pieris, then Director Operations at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) to carry out what was officially termed a "fact finding mission." What is not clear is whether this secret "mission" was initiated on their own or on the orders of any higher political authority and why it merited such high priority. But, Brigadier Pieris who was later posted as Defence Attache in the Sri Lanka Embassy in Washington D.C. has now been re-called to Colombo.
The reason given by Admiral Sandagiri for the secret fact finding mission was a report the Head of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Hagrup Haukland had sent Jayantha Dhanapala, then Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat. This report had followed a meeting Mr. Haukland has had with Mr. Dhanapala's then deputy, John Gooneratne on March 24. It had also related to SLMM internal special reports received by Mr. Haukland.
A copy of Mr Haukland's report dated March 30, 2005 was obtained by The Sunday Times. This is what it says:
"Monitors from SLMM District Office 5 in Batticaloa (DO 5) visited the alleged Karuna Group Camp in Thivuchchenai / Diwulsena on 26 March at approximately 0900 hours.
"The Karuna Group Camp is located on the northern side of the road and fenced with barbed wire. The size of the camp is approximately 50X30 metres with fire positions in the corners. The Camp has a mix of accommodations (sic) and more structures.
"There are check points (CPs) on both sides of the camp. The eastern one (nearest the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) position) is unmanned but the one on the other side was manned by 9 males. When SLMM monitors approached the camp the cadres were seen hiding a T-56 assault rifle (AK 47) (sic)"The SLMM monitors met the second in command (2ic) of the camp at the Western CP and the atmosphere was very relaxed and friendly. "He openly admitted that he and his comrades are Karuna cadres and that they came to this jungle area North of Senapura in September 2004.
The first camps were established in the jungle north of Thivuchchena/Diwulsena village but in December 2004 the Karuna faction established a camp in the village itself. Initially the camp was located closer to the tarmac road before SLA told them to move. The camp was then moved to its present location. According to the 2ic, today's total strength of this Karuna group is 140 combatants. The main Karuna camps are now in the jungle North of Thivuchchenai/Diwulsena.
"Until 16 March 05 the Karuna Faction used this camp without any interference from SLA. This day an SLA uniformed officer came to the camp and told that cadres carrying weapons would have to pull back to the jungle and that armed cadres seen inside the village would be arrested by the SLA.
"According to the 2ic, SLA is patrolling through the village regularly and at least once a day. The patrols pass alongside the camp, continuing some hundred metres before returning the same way they came. When SLA patrols approach, the Karuna cadres hide their weapons. "Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission will follow up this case and continue our inquiry."
Nine days before Mr. Haukland's report to the Peace Secretariat, the SLMM District Office had also sent its headquarters in Colombo a report. Dated March 21, this report referred to the Karuna camp in the village of Thivuchchenai. It also referred to a report made to the District Office by then GOC of the Army's 23 Division at Welikanda, then Brigadier Vajira Wijegunawardena. He had referred to a shooting incident near the village.
This is what the office of SLMM's District 5 in Batticaloa said in its report to its own headquarters in Colombo:
"Along A 11 Road on the way from Valaichchenai to Manampiriya, DO 5 (District Office 5) could observe an increased number of SLA checkpoints (approx 6, compared to normally 2). DO5 further followed the road from Sewanapitiya junction through Muttugala to Thivuchchenai approx. 7km north, where we stopped and asked villagers at five different places about the location of the alleged Karuna camp. They all acknowledged the presence of the camp, located in the Thivuchchenai, besides giving the location of a SLA army post in the village.
"Approx. 300m before the alleged Karuna camp, we asked at the said SLA army post (3 soldiers) about the location of the Karuna camp, and were informed that the camp was just around the corner.
"As DO5 continued a few hundred meters, passing through one unmanned checkpoint, a total of 20 men partly in civilian and military looking outfits (on both sides of the road), approx. five (5) with arms and one (1) armed man (45-50 years old) in full combat gear could be observed. Upon returning, another unmanned checkpoint was seen at the end of the village.
"When leaving the area, two men on a motorbike (passenger in military trousers/bike no. 363990) is following the DO5 vehicle, stopping at the nearest SLA army post, approaching the soldiers. Upon seeing our vehicle stopping next to the same SLA soldiers, they quickly move to the nearby shop. It was obvious that they did not want to be seen with the SLA.
Approx. 2km away from the alleged Karuna camp, DO5 met with a high speeding dark red Nissan van with the SLA Army marking in the front window, heading to the direction of Thivuchechenai (approx. 10:00am)"When returning to DO5 office, HOD (Head of District) was contacted by somebody presenting himself from the "Army HQ", asking where we have been and what we have seen. No detailed information was given."
Brigadier Peiris submitted a report on April 12 to then Vice Admiral Sandagiri. Among his findings:
Substantial evidence indicated the existence of the camp. However, the said camp was found abandoned. People in the area confirmed that the presence of cadres in civilian/military looking outfits is common. Some carried weapons. Mostly the cadres operated during dark hours. After detection of the camp by SLMM, the villagers said that two foreign nationals had come and warned the cadres to vacate the camp.
There is no evidence to confirm an Army officer visited the camp or asked cadres to pull back.
Sri Lanka National Guard troops present in the area were not patrolling the areas that surrounded the camp. There were signs of electricity being tapped illegally. There were also signs of cooking being carried out. Used military type uniforms, boots and shoes were lying in some semi permanent huts.
According to civilians, there had been a camp of Karuna cadres at Thivuchchenai. However, period when Karuna cadres abandoned camp cannot be confirmed. It is presumed it came after March 21.
The assumption that military operating with Karuna group can be ruled out as no evidence whatsoever is available. Vice Admiral Sandagiri has since been promoted Admiral and continues to head the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH). In this capacity, he is responsible for co-ordinating all military operations against Tiger guerrillas. Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda has been promoted to the rank of a four star General upon his retirement. He is to be given a diplomatic assignment abroad.
Sri Lanka Marxists demand fresh peace process
[ AFP ] [ 11:22 GMT, Feb. 14, 2006 ]
Sri Lanka's main Marxist party, a key member of the ruling coalition, has demanded a brand-new peace process to replace the Norwegian-led initiative, which it said had failed. The JVP, or People's Liberation Front, said President Mahinda Rajapakse should adopt a "fresh approach" to negotiating peace with the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. "This is a new beginning," the JVP said in a three-page statement on Tuesday. "This is not a continuation of the failed peace process in the past." The hardline nationalistic JVP, which strongly backed Rajapakse at his election bid in November, has been highly critical of peace broker Norway and wanted to kick Norwegians off a truce monitoring panel as well. The JVP's latest statement did not say who should replace the peace broker, but maintained there should be a new initiative. "The government should break away from the old path to achieve peace," it said.
Sri Lanka extends state of emergency amid Tamil boycott
[ AFP ] [ 11:25 GMT, Feb. 14, 2006 ]
Sri Lanka's parliament has extended a state of emergency for one month, saying the country's security situation did not allow an easing of the tough anti-terror laws. "We are also not happy with the emergency, but we need it because of the security situation" government's chief peace negotiator Nimal Siripala de Silva told parliament. "When the situation returns to normal, we will revoke it."Legislators from the minority Tamil National Alliance (TNA) stayed away from the national parliament in protest at what they say is the harassment of civilians.The TNA, which has 22 members in parliament, also opposes search operations carried out by security forces under emergency laws. The constitution requires that the state of emergency be approved by parliament before it can be extended for a maximum period of one month at a time. The rebels had asked the government to lift the state of emergency saying it was adding pressure to an already tenuous ceasefire which peace broker Norway arranged and put in place from February 2002.
The U.S. roll in Sri Lanka
[ TamilCanadian ] [ 11:35 GMT, Feb. 14, 2006 ]
Sinhalese ruling regimes, including the present one, allied as they are with racist groups of the worst order, should fear that their unsavory past should undo their future. Instead, they are being bolstered by the U.S. government to believe that their spurious past is a tolerable sin which can be forgotten and forgiven. We Tamils are not only astonished that these conditions are allowed to continue, but are deeply disappointed at the prospect that the U.S. government seems to be unaware of the gravity of the problem facing us. We can only view the near future as a long gray blur, based on the U.S, government’s clearly demonstrated biasses in favor of the GOSL. What we need is a future brimming with pulsating events brightening the prospects for peace, inplace of the most powerful nation in the world supporting the last of Sinhalese regimes glued to a belief in the religious right to discriminate.
[ TamilCanadian ] [ 02:12 GMT, Feb. 14, 2006 ]
"Monitors from SLMM District Office 5 in Batticaloa (DO 5) visited the alleged Karuna Group Camp in Thivuchchenai / Diwulsena on 26 March at approximately 0900 hours. "The Karuna Group Camp is located on the northern side of the road and fenced with barbed wire. The size of the camp is approximately 50X30 metres with fire positions in the corners. The Camp has a mix of accommodations (sic) and more structures. The first camps were established in the jungle north of Thivuchchena/Diwulsena village but in December 2004 the Karuna faction established a camp in the village itself. Initially the camp was located closer to the tarmac road before SLA told them to move. The camp was then moved to its present location. According to the 2ic, today's total strength of this Karuna group is 140 combatants. The main Karuna camps are now in the jungle North of Thivuchchenai/Diwulsena.
National Police and Para-Military forces
Source: The Library of Congress
The Sri Lankan National Police is an integral part of the nation's security forces, with primary responsibility for internal security. Specially trained commando units of the police are regularly deployed in joint operations with the armed forces, and the police command structure in Northern and Eastern provinces is closely integrated with the other security organizations under the authority of the Joint Operations Command. The police is headed by an inspector general of police who reports to the minister of defense.
Organization
In 1988 the police force was divided into three geographic commands--known as ranges--covering the northern, central, and southern sectors of the island. The ranges were subdivided into divisions, districts, and stations, and Colombo was designated as a special division. In 1974 there were a total of 260 police stations throughout the country. In more remote rural areas beyond the immediate range of existing police stations, law enforcement functions are carried out by locally elected village headmen (grama seva niladhari, literally "village service officers"). In addition to its regular forces, the national police operated a small reserve contingent and a number of specialized units responsible for investigative and paramilitary functions. Routine criminal activity was handled by the Criminal Investigation Department under the command of an assistant superintendent of police. More coordinated threats to internal security, such as that posed by the radical Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna were the responsibility of the Countersubversive Division, which was primarily an investigative division. Special operational units included the Commando Squad of the Colombo police and the Special Task Force. The former, a 200-strong riot control force, was established following the anti-Tamil riots of 1983. The Special Task Force is a police field force. It was set up in 1984 with the assistance of foreign advisers (primarily former British Special Air Service personnel under the auspices of Keeny Meeny Services, see Sri Lanka - Foreign Military Relations , this ch.). Its 1,100-member force was organized into 7 companies and trained in counterinsurgency techniques. It played a major role in the government's combined force operations against the Tamil Tigers in Eastern Province before July 1987. Following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the Special Task Force was redesignated the Police Special Force, and deployed in Southern Province, where it immediately went into action against the JVP terrorists. Companies of the force also served in rotation as part of the presidential security guard.
Until 1984 the police were responsible for national intelligence functions, first under the Special Branch, and later under the Intelligence Services Division. The perceived failure of the Intelligence Services Division during the riots of July 1983 led the Jayewardene government to reevaluate the nation's intelligence network, and in 1984 the president set up a National Intelligence Bureau. The new organization combined intelligence units from the army, navy, air force, and police. It was headed by a deputy inspector general of police who reported directly to the Ministry of Defence.
Karuna Camp: The secret probe
By: Iqbal Athas
Source: The Sunday Times - December 25, 2005
Two high ranking officers in the country's security establishment, The Sunday Times can reveal today, carried out a "TOP SECRET" operation in March, this year, to probe a matter of serious concern for Tiger guerrillas - attacks on them by the renegade Karuna group purportedly in collusion with the Sri Lanka Army.
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) then Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri (also then Commander of the Navy) and former Commander of the Army, then Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda were acting on a report in a Sunday newspaper. The report in March, this year, had revealed that the Karuna group operated a camp in Thivuchchenai in the Polonnaruwa district.
This revelation, however, was first probed by Army Headquarters. Thereafter, writing on behalf of the Commander of the Army, Brigadier J. Jayasuriya sent a report to Chief of Defence Staff, then Vice Admiral Sandagiri. In this report dated March 30, 2005 he said investigations revealed that the bunker referred to in the report was located in the Muthugala village (Grid Reference: 435090 -Vakaneri Map).
The report said: "Security Forces have abandoned this bunker. Commanding Officer has investigated the bunker 231 and taken photographs. These photographs were given to us. This bunker has not been used by Karuna cadres for any reasons."
"This newspaper article is wrong and gives the wrong impression to people. This kind of newspaper article can create problems to the peace process. There can be disputes between the Government and the LTTE." the report added. Based on this report, then Military Spokesman was directed to issue a denial which he did.
But the matter did not stop there. Admiral Sandagiri and Lt. Gen. Kottegoda detailed Brigadier Milinda Pieris, then Director Operations at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) to carry out what was officially termed a "fact finding mission." What is not clear is whether this secret "mission" was initiated on their own or on the orders of any higher political authority and why it merited such high priority. But, Brigadier Pieris who was later posted as Defence Attache in the Sri Lanka Embassy in Washington D.C. has now been re-called to Colombo.
The reason given by Admiral Sandagiri for the secret fact finding mission was a report the Head of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Hagrup Haukland had sent Jayantha Dhanapala, then Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat. This report had followed a meeting Mr. Haukland has had with Mr. Dhanapala's then deputy, John Gooneratne on March 24. It had also related to SLMM internal special reports received by Mr. Haukland.
A copy of Mr Haukland's report dated March 30, 2005 was obtained by The Sunday Times. This is what it says:
"Monitors from SLMM District Office 5 in Batticaloa (DO 5) visited the alleged Karuna Group Camp in Thivuchchenai / Diwulsena on 26 March at approximately 0900 hours.
"The Karuna Group Camp is located on the northern side of the road and fenced with barbed wire. The size of the camp is approximately 50X30 metres with fire positions in the corners. The Camp has a mix of accommodations (sic) and more structures.
"There are check points (CPs) on both sides of the camp. The eastern one (nearest the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) position) is unmanned but the one on the other side was manned by 9 males. When SLMM monitors approached the camp the cadres were seen hiding a T-56 assault rifle (AK 47) (sic)"The SLMM monitors met the second in command (2ic) of the camp at the Western CP and the atmosphere was very relaxed and friendly. "He openly admitted that he and his comrades are Karuna cadres and that they came to this jungle area North of Senapura in September 2004.
The first camps were established in the jungle north of Thivuchchena/Diwulsena village but in December 2004 the Karuna faction established a camp in the village itself. Initially the camp was located closer to the tarmac road before SLA told them to move. The camp was then moved to its present location. According to the 2ic, today's total strength of this Karuna group is 140 combatants. The main Karuna camps are now in the jungle North of Thivuchchenai/Diwulsena.
"Until 16 March 05 the Karuna Faction used this camp without any interference from SLA. This day an SLA uniformed officer came to the camp and told that cadres carrying weapons would have to pull back to the jungle and that armed cadres seen inside the village would be arrested by the SLA.
"According to the 2ic, SLA is patrolling through the village regularly and at least once a day. The patrols pass alongside the camp, continuing some hundred metres before returning the same way they came. When SLA patrols approach, the Karuna cadres hide their weapons. "Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission will follow up this case and continue our inquiry."
Nine days before Mr. Haukland's report to the Peace Secretariat, the SLMM District Office had also sent its headquarters in Colombo a report. Dated March 21, this report referred to the Karuna camp in the village of Thivuchchenai. It also referred to a report made to the District Office by then GOC of the Army's 23 Division at Welikanda, then Brigadier Vajira Wijegunawardena. He had referred to a shooting incident near the village.
This is what the office of SLMM's District 5 in Batticaloa said in its report to its own headquarters in Colombo:
"Along A 11 Road on the way from Valaichchenai to Manampiriya, DO 5 (District Office 5) could observe an increased number of SLA checkpoints (approx 6, compared to normally 2). DO5 further followed the road from Sewanapitiya junction through Muttugala to Thivuchchenai approx. 7km north, where we stopped and asked villagers at five different places about the location of the alleged Karuna camp. They all acknowledged the presence of the camp, located in the Thivuchchenai, besides giving the location of a SLA army post in the village.
"Approx. 300m before the alleged Karuna camp, we asked at the said SLA army post (3 soldiers) about the location of the Karuna camp, and were informed that the camp was just around the corner.
"As DO5 continued a few hundred meters, passing through one unmanned checkpoint, a total of 20 men partly in civilian and military looking outfits (on both sides of the road), approx. five (5) with arms and one (1) armed man (45-50 years old) in full combat gear could be observed. Upon returning, another unmanned checkpoint was seen at the end of the village.
"When leaving the area, two men on a motorbike (passenger in military trousers/bike no. 363990) is following the DO5 vehicle, stopping at the nearest SLA army post, approaching the soldiers. Upon seeing our vehicle stopping next to the same SLA soldiers, they quickly move to the nearby shop. It was obvious that they did not want to be seen with the SLA.
Approx. 2km away from the alleged Karuna camp, DO5 met with a high speeding dark red Nissan van with the SLA Army marking in the front window, heading to the direction of Thivuchechenai (approx. 10:00am)"When returning to DO5 office, HOD (Head of District) was contacted by somebody presenting himself from the "Army HQ", asking where we have been and what we have seen. No detailed information was given."
Brigadier Peiris submitted a report on April 12 to then Vice Admiral Sandagiri. Among his findings:
Substantial evidence indicated the existence of the camp. However, the said camp was found abandoned. People in the area confirmed that the presence of cadres in civilian/military looking outfits is common. Some carried weapons. Mostly the cadres operated during dark hours. After detection of the camp by SLMM, the villagers said that two foreign nationals had come and warned the cadres to vacate the camp.
There is no evidence to confirm an Army officer visited the camp or asked cadres to pull back.
Sri Lanka National Guard troops present in the area were not patrolling the areas that surrounded the camp. There were signs of electricity being tapped illegally. There were also signs of cooking being carried out. Used military type uniforms, boots and shoes were lying in some semi permanent huts.
According to civilians, there had been a camp of Karuna cadres at Thivuchchenai. However, period when Karuna cadres abandoned camp cannot be confirmed. It is presumed it came after March 21.
The assumption that military operating with Karuna group can be ruled out as no evidence whatsoever is available. Vice Admiral Sandagiri has since been promoted Admiral and continues to head the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH). In this capacity, he is responsible for co-ordinating all military operations against Tiger guerrillas. Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda has been promoted to the rank of a four star General upon his retirement. He is to be given a diplomatic assignment abroad.
Sri Lanka Marxists demand fresh peace process
[ AFP ] [ 11:22 GMT, Feb. 14, 2006 ]
Sri Lanka's main Marxist party, a key member of the ruling coalition, has demanded a brand-new peace process to replace the Norwegian-led initiative, which it said had failed. The JVP, or People's Liberation Front, said President Mahinda Rajapakse should adopt a "fresh approach" to negotiating peace with the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. "This is a new beginning," the JVP said in a three-page statement on Tuesday. "This is not a continuation of the failed peace process in the past." The hardline nationalistic JVP, which strongly backed Rajapakse at his election bid in November, has been highly critical of peace broker Norway and wanted to kick Norwegians off a truce monitoring panel as well. The JVP's latest statement did not say who should replace the peace broker, but maintained there should be a new initiative. "The government should break away from the old path to achieve peace," it said.
Sri Lanka extends state of emergency amid Tamil boycott
[ AFP ] [ 11:25 GMT, Feb. 14, 2006 ]
Sri Lanka's parliament has extended a state of emergency for one month, saying the country's security situation did not allow an easing of the tough anti-terror laws. "We are also not happy with the emergency, but we need it because of the security situation" government's chief peace negotiator Nimal Siripala de Silva told parliament. "When the situation returns to normal, we will revoke it."Legislators from the minority Tamil National Alliance (TNA) stayed away from the national parliament in protest at what they say is the harassment of civilians.The TNA, which has 22 members in parliament, also opposes search operations carried out by security forces under emergency laws. The constitution requires that the state of emergency be approved by parliament before it can be extended for a maximum period of one month at a time. The rebels had asked the government to lift the state of emergency saying it was adding pressure to an already tenuous ceasefire which peace broker Norway arranged and put in place from February 2002.
The U.S. roll in Sri Lanka
[ TamilCanadian ] [ 11:35 GMT, Feb. 14, 2006 ]
Sinhalese ruling regimes, including the present one, allied as they are with racist groups of the worst order, should fear that their unsavory past should undo their future. Instead, they are being bolstered by the U.S. government to believe that their spurious past is a tolerable sin which can be forgotten and forgiven. We Tamils are not only astonished that these conditions are allowed to continue, but are deeply disappointed at the prospect that the U.S. government seems to be unaware of the gravity of the problem facing us. We can only view the near future as a long gray blur, based on the U.S, government’s clearly demonstrated biasses in favor of the GOSL. What we need is a future brimming with pulsating events brightening the prospects for peace, inplace of the most powerful nation in the world supporting the last of Sinhalese regimes glued to a belief in the religious right to discriminate.